Google has complained about certain features of Microsoft's Vista to antitrust officials. Given the FTC's current investigation of Google's merger with Doubleclick, the company might be wiser to avoid setting off another DOJ feeding frenzy. Antitrust law is a flawed policy instrument at its best, and the hunter easily becomes the hunted. Particularly in the EU.

The New York Times, noting the same complaint, writes on the DOJ's enforcement of the department's consent decree with Microsoft. This is a somewhat peculiar article. It does not mention harm to consumers. The enforcement of the consent decree is seen as an end in itself, and (the alleged) lack thereof as a problem in itself. This ignores the

highly subjective and political nature of antitrust enforcement. Different administrations have very different views on how and whether certain antitrust principles ought to be enforced. Assuming that vigorous pursuit of another administration's enforcement goals under a consent decree is an "ought" gives rise to an interesting pro-enforcement ratchet effect. If Administration A (or the EU) pursues company X and arrives at a consent decree, Administration B (which might have quite a different view of antitrust) is expected to actively pursue the darn thing even if in the views of Administration B it does more harm than good. Whereas if Administration A (or the EU) made the judgment that a decree ought not to be pursued, Administration B would not be expected to comport itself according to that judgment. Antitrust law is being treated as if it were an exact science. Enforcement is a good in itself, and evidently costless.

The conflict described in the article for Barnett strikes me (in the absence of other information) as a pretty ordinary one, correctly resolved by his being cleared to work on the matter.

posted by Solveig Singleton @ 11:16 AM | Antitrust

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