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03.28.2007 (previous | next)
Delusions of Grandeur: GPLv3 Is A License That Thinks It‘s a Regulation

Having examined the latest draft of the Free Software Foundation’s General Public License version 3 (GPLv3) several times, and having looked over the Rationale document, I have come to a diagnosis.

If GPLv3 were a human being, one would say that it has delusions of grandeur. It thinks it is a law rather than a license.

Legally speaking, GPLv3 is a license, which is a form of contract. It specifies the terms on which the holder of copyrights or patents on software will permit others to make use of it. It is a bit of a special case because it is open to the world at large; anyone may use it, without payment, as long as they abide by its terms, which is unusual in contract law. However, there are doctrines of promissory estoppel and third party beneficiaries that take account of such things, and GPLv3 is firmly within the legal genre of contract.

But the GPLv3 was apparently drafted on the assumption that it is something quite different -- that it is a regulation controlling a range of general behavior by software users, and that it is being promulgated by a governmental body with law-creating power.

The difference between a contract and a regulation is extremely important.

The most basic principle of drafting a contract is to strive for clarity. All parties involved should know clearly their rights and duties. Failure to achieve clarity raises transaction costs of all kinds as interested parties squabble and struggle to decipher the inscrutable and cope with unforeseen risks, and it often ends in bitterness and litigation.

Tricky lawyers have known for centuries that ambiguity in a contract can be useful. Sneak some murky language in and then insist that it really means something to your advantage that the other party did not intend to agree to.

And judges have known for centuries that there are tricky lawyers. So a tenet of contract law is that ambiguities are construed against the party that drafted the document, especially in the case of form contracts, such as software licenses, which the buyer (or licensee) must take-or-leave without negotiation.

Laws or regulations are subject to different interpretive rules. Legal doctrines of administrative law give government officials great latitude in interpreting ambiguous laws and regulations, never mind that they may be the chief architects of the confusion.

In consequence, government drafters are often motivated to seek ambiguity rather than clarity.

A simple reason is that various parties with a veto over the product may not agree on what it should say. To get something out the door, the drafters elide the issues, kicking the can to later parts of the process.

A more Machiavellian process may also be at work. Courts give considerable deference to government interpretations or rules, so substantial rewards of power await the official who induces Congress to draft a confusing law, or his fellow agency staffers a muddy a regulation. He/she can then issue “guidance” or “interpretive rules” or even a legal complaint in an enforcement action in which some theretofore hidden standard is unveiled. (See, e.g., Out of Bounds, Out of Control: Regulatory Enforcement at the EPA (Cato Institute 2002).)

GPLv3 bears the marks of such a process of deliberately crafted ambiguity. designed to enable future surprises, and not pleasant ones for the regulatees. Virtually every important provision is subject to multiple interpretations.

For example, with respect to the important question whether Digital Rights Management systems could be used in conjunction with programs released under GPLv3, the language of the license is murky and numerous ancillary statements by the drafters express strong hostility to DRM. On the other hand, one of the key figures in the debate recently published a note saying that everyone was misunderstanding the situation and that DRM is indeed compatible with GPLv3.

So why has the issue not been made clear? The debate has been going on for two years. Any sensible corporate GC will say that he has quite enough to do in dealing with real government regs without adding the FSF to his roster of inscrutable oracles.

Why the FSF should have a Machiavellian motivation is easy to explain. As many have noted, the Free Software Foundation is hostile to all forms of property in software and other creations of the intellect, and eager to use the GPLv3 as an instrument of this antipathy.

Confusion substantially raises the transaction costs of users who want to combine proprietary and open programs, and the FSF can selectively enforce of the terms of the license to promote or hobble perceived friends and foes. IBM, which pours money into the open source movement, can be given indulgence; Microsoft better keep its lawyers working overtime.

This “FSF is a government equivalent” mentality was at work with respect to GPLv2, which is bedeviled by the definitional problems about what constitutes a “derivative work.” In explaining it, FSF has made references to FAQs and other extraneous materials, similar to a regulatory agency invoking legislative history. The approach as been radically expanded in the GPLv3, which was originally billed as an effort at clarification.

This strategy of seeking ambiguity has a problem, however. Whatever grandiose fantasies the FSF has about itself as a government, possessed of authority to draft regulations, it is not. FSF is a private body that has drafted a form contract. It does not get to into court and enforce new meanings. Instead, on murky points, a judge will decide what it means, and the FSF should lose.

And once the ambiguities are stripped out, there is not going to be much left of the GPLv3.

=====================
Additional credentials: Long before his IP career, James DeLong was the Research Director of the Administrative Conference of the United States, which was dedicated to studying issues of administrative law. Before that, he helped draft and issue regulations for the Federal Trade Commission. In fact, he once co-wrote a regulation that caught the eye of a Washington Star column called “Gobbledygook,” which featured particularly striking examples of this bureaucratic art form. Unfortunately, we were not, that time, trying for obscurity

posted by James DeLong @ 12:56 PM | Software

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Comments

To paraphrase the anonymous author: Don't anthropomorphize legal documents. They hate it.

Seriously, though, I wonder how much of the ambiguity is due to a desire to allow wiggle room and how much is due to a desire to reach a compromise among several parties who will share a common form contract. Are there examples beyond the GPL series where the courts have interpreted a form contract created by a disparate group of people, adopted by a separate group of people who are largely non-lawyers, with counterparties who are a third group who are, in the case of companies, sophisticated consumers of legal services?

Posted by: False Data at March 29, 2007 10:27 PM

I'm concerned about the ambiguities, too.

To set the context, I'll note that I'm a lawyer who represents a lot of software companies, some of whom have open-sourced their products, others who incorporate open source into their products, and, yes, some proprietary companies.

For all its merits, GPLv2 was less than clear in certain aspects. I've spent a lot of time, for instance, helping clients understand whether something is a derivative work or "a work based on the Program." But over the years, we all got a level of comfort with the document. There were disagreements on the edges, sure, but there was a general consensus about how the GPLv2 worked.

The object of revising GPLv2 was ostensibly to improve and clarify it. With respect, this latest draft of GPLv3 is hardly clear; to the contrary, there's a lot more ambiguity. For instance:

-it's hard to tell what position the draft takes with regard to embedded code and DRM.

-the automatic licensing of downstream recipients in Section 10 isn't very clear. What rights are conveyed, and to whom?

-the draft uses a lot of different language to refer to patent licenses. In Section 11, para 1, for instance, says "each contributor grants you a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free patent license under the contributor's essential patent claims in the contribution, to make use, sell, offer for sale, import, and otherwise run, modify, and propagate the contribution." Section 10 says "each time you convey a covered work, the receipient automatically receives a license from the original licensors to run, modify and propagate that work." Section 11, para 3 requires a party relying on a patent license to cause source code "to be so available." Are these licenses supposed to be all the same? Or are there differences?

-Section 11, para 2 defines "patent license" for the following paragraphs. The definition would seem to include the broad patent pools or licenses that are common in the industry or related to defined standards. If so, it would make it hard for GPLv3 code to include popular standardized technologies that are covered by patents.

I've heard Eben Moglen speak on several occasions, and he's acknowledged that he's intentionally included ambiguous terms in the license. While those ambiguities may give Moglen and the FSF flexibility to interpret and enforce the license, it creates real problems for software developers that genuinely want to try to understand and apply it. In fact, the point of a written license is to provide the parties with some clarity about what they can and can't do. Deliberate ambiguity undermines this goal -- and it creates a real risk that a court will apply the well-established legal rule that it should construe the ambiguous terms against the person who drafted it.

In sum, then, I'm concerned that the efforts to tailor the GPLv3 to target the Microsoft/Novell deal have created a lot of uncertainties that will dissuade commercial open source developers from adopting it.


Posted by: EJN at March 30, 2007 4:27 PM








 
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