Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, from the Kennedy School of Govt, has an excellent paper on potential uses of DRM outside of intellectual property; particularly in the area of privacy. Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights With DRM, 84 Denver University L. Rev. 181 (2006).

While copyright policy is not the main topic of Mayer-Schönberger’s argument, he makes several insightful observations on DRM that relate to digital copyright discourse.

First, Mayer-Schönberger argues that DRM need not be perfect to be valuable. Rather, it need only act as a sufficient deterrant to piracy.

Critics have contended that every DRM system to date has been broken relatively swiftly, eroding the very foundation on which the entire idea of access control rests. However, enforcement does not need to be perfect—it is sufficient if it deters enough to shape the behavior of many consumers. Apple’s DRM is a case in point...

The next time somebody tells you that DRM should be banned, or freely circumvented because it does not stop pircy, just smile and say: "thanks Mr. Strawman, but its enough that DRM deters piracy." If he doesn't believe you, ask the Strawman to explain whether Apple and other DRM leveraging firms benefit from DRM even though piracy still occurs, and then direct him to the second major Mayer-Schönberger observation.

Second, Mayer-Schönberger points to how firms can leverage DRM in a digital world where illegal circumvention tools and renegade P2P networks provide wide illicit access to content. Consumers still choose to purchase goods and services with DRM, even with the alternative of obtaining these freely, for the added value of ease, purchasing experience and quality.

Less than perfect DRM systems will continue to thrive as long as content owners deem the revenue generated more important than the leakages of content that are occurring. Of course, any change in the value proposition to the consumer—for example by raising prices or making pricing less transparent—may have an effect on consumer behavior, potentially increasing leakage and undermining the DRM system. This is one reason Apple has a strong incentive to keep iTunes Music Store’s pricing model simple and transparent.

Mayer-Schönberger observes one disturbing aspect of the dual- DRM/P2P market; firms like Apple are deterred from raising prices out of fear that consumers may perceive the added costs outweighing the benefits of legal purchases, and then opt for getting their goods and services illegally. This effect of piracy, to quash the ability of firms to raise prices, may curtail potential rise in revenue of copyright holders who license their content to services like iTunes. In my view, such effect on copyright holders' ability to raise prices can be converted into lost revenue calculations due to piracy.

Third, Mayer-Schönberger recognizes the connection between DRM and its legal enforcement (a la the DMCA). While this point may be beyond obvious, there are still some sworn enemies of DRM who criticize DRM for not entirely stopping piracy while imposing some restrictions on consumers, yet, they then criticize copyright holders for leveraging the DMCA to enforce DRM protection. The strategy of such DRM-DMCA critics is to distort understanding of the basic DRM-DMCA relationship.

DRM is more than a technical fix to prevent unauthorized copying. As a system, [DRM] depends not just on technology, but on institutions and market incentives, and presupposes law to prevent too much leakage from happening. While not perfect, DRM systems have been relatively successful in controlling access and will remain so as long as their value propositions are attractive.

The remainder of Mayer-Schönberger's paper talks about alternative uses for DRM. But even the discussion on how DRM can help preserve privacy rebuts the arguments of DRM critics who see DRM as representing some kind of undemocractic, centrally planned means of technical control or loss to their liberty. Perhaps such DRM critics should ask whether their approach of conceptualizing DRM as representative of policial values may also suggest that they don't see DRM's potential in protecting privacy and personal information.