For the most part, your solutions are fine. My only argument is the emphasis on litigation-based solutions. The "let the courts sort it out" mentality is the wrong approach -- it creates uncertainty on the front end of development (because no one is sure when they are infringing) and unplanned-for expense on the back-end (in the case of litigation). The focus should be on keeping weak patents from ever being approved by the PTO. Litigation should be a last-ditch effort, not a routine clarification mechanism.

Litigation is always costly and to be minimized. Encouraging defendants to litigate weak claims and making it easier to get rid of them in court will ultimately (since the plaintiffs are repeat players) discourage them from being brought when it matters most.

Ideally, of course, the solution would be to improve patent quality at the front end. BUT a) a substantial increase in quality won't matter much, since most patents are just stuffed in a drawer and b) even a few lousy ones could be the basis of a series of prosecutions to settlement under the current set of incentives. Furthermore UNLESS and UNTIL c) the PTO and probably the Federal Circuit are functioning better as institutions, internal reform of PTO functions is likely to be resources down the drain, as I set out in my paper. The exception is those that help with accountability, also as set out in the paper.