Thanks to Greg Aharonian for the link to the FTC's material on Rambus, for naughtily trying to sneak patented tech into a standard:

"Rambus withheld information that would have been highly material to the standard-setting process within JEDEC. JEDEC expressly sought information about patents to enable its members to make informed decisions about which technologies to adopt, and JEDEC members viewed early knowledge of potential patent consequences as vital for avoiding patent hold-up. Rambus understood that knowledge of its evolving patent position would be material to JEDEC's choices, and avoided disclosure for that very reason."

"Through its successful strategy, Rambus was able to conceal its patents and patent applications until after the standards were adopted and the market was locked in," states the opinion. "Only then did Rambus reveal its patents - through patent infringement lawsuits against JEDEC members who practiced the standard."

Analyzing Rambus's conduct under the standards of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Commission found that "Rambus engaged in exclusionaryconduct that significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power in four related markets. By hiding the potential that Rambus would be able to impose royalty obligations of its own choosing, and by silently using JEDEC to assemble a patent portfolio to cover the SDRAM and DDR SDRAM standards, Rambus's conduct significantly contributed toJEDEC's choice of Rambus's technologies for incorporation in the JEDEC DRAM standards and to JEDEC's failure to secure assurances regarding future royalty rates - which, in turn, significantly contributed to Rambus's acquisition of monopoly power."

Since I am skeptical of antitrust concepts generally, I can't help but wonder how this would have played out as a plain old contract suit, assuming the standards-setting body dealt with Rambus on those terms.

And lest this be taken for a screed in favor of excluding patented tech from standards no matter what, I add this

note about Quaalcom. Seems to me that in that instance the company's control of the patents behind CDMA technology helped solve coordination problems and bring the product to market with much greater alacrity than would have been possible otherwise. Will try to learn more.

posted by Solveig Singleton @ 1:20 PM | Antitrust, Patents, Standards

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