A professor of economics adds a Public Choice argument to the debate:

I tend to put on my right-wing public-choice hat here, and side with GooglePrint. The private beneficiaries from assigning too much of the value of innovation to the dead hand of old property rights are concentrated. The private beneficiaries of assigning too little of the value are diffuse. In a public-choice world ruled by lobbyists, there will be strong pressures on legislation and law to overprotect existing property. And it is the duty of intellectuals seeking the sweet spot to push back--to be an anti-lobbyist lobby.

On the particular issue, I am unconvinced that Google, allied with the massed forces of the CEA and academia, qualifies as a diffuse interest. We pro-property rights people are the ones beleaguered inside the walls, "while outside the ring of barbarian spears drew closer, burning to ravish the city of the world's desire." (That's a rough recollection of a phrase from a history of Byzantium that I read long ago -- but I could not find the source in Google Print. C'mon guys.)

But on the broader point about Public Choice: the impact of the Internet on Public Choice problems is a fascinating issue. The Net can greatly decrease some of the costs of organizing diffuse groups, and thus can offset the natural advantages of fiscal predators. On the other hand, it is not clear that this will have any effect on actual outcomes because the organization of the diffuse does not extend into the general electorate, whereas the concentrated beneficies can still pay to market their position.

In any event, the winners in the existing poltical system are taking no chances.

posted by James DeLong @ 8:53 AM | Economics, Game Theory & Public Choice

Link to this Entry | Printer-Friendly | Email a Comment | Post a Comment(0)